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This paper will explore the development of Leibniz’s metaphysics of the Incarnation in the context of his philosophy.​[1]​ In particular it will ask to what extent Leibniz’s repeated endorsement of the traditional analogy between the union in humankind of soul (mind) and body, and the union in Christ of divine and human natures, could be accommodated by his more general metaphysical doctrines. Such an investigation will uncover some of the deepest commitments in Leibniz’s theory of substance as well as detect in it some unresolved tensions.
Throughout his life, Leibniz accepts the mystery of the Incarnation as a truth above reason, defending this key traditional dogma against charges of logical impossibility and endeavoring to present a possible metaphysical model of the union of human and divine natures in Christ.​[2]​ As early as 1668-69 he plans to attack a series of doctrines that, in his view, incorrectly formulate (or even deny) the relationship between human nature and divine nature in Jesus Christ, including Arianism, Nestorianism, Monophysitism, Ubiquitarianism, Theopaschitism, and Monothelitism. Leibniz’s own doctrine regarding the way in which divine and human natures are united in Christ remains constantly opposed to the theological currents just mentioned and begins to take shape already in his youth. In the following years he continues to refine his position, basing it on two pillars: on the one hand, the acceptance and development of the tradition that proposes the analogy between the union of soul and body in humankind and the union of the divine and human natures in Christ; and, on the other, the rejection of the communication of properties between the human and divine nature of Christ (the so-called communicatio idiomatum) as a doctrine which implies contradiction and, therefore, cannot be true.
I will begin by considering his early metaphysics of the Incarnation as expounded in De Incarnatione Dei (1669-1670). I will then discuss his mature views with particular reference to two texts of the mid-1680s, De Persona Christi (1680-84*) and Examen Religionis Christianae (April-October 1686*).​[3]​ Finally, I will tackle Leibniz’s remarks of 1712 on the Incarnation in the context of his late discussion on the vinculum substantiale (substantial bond) in the correspondence with the Jesuit Bartholomew Des Bosses.​[4]​

De Incarnatione Dei (1669-1670)

De Incarnatione Dei was probably composed in 1669 or 1670. It seems to have been part of a broader work that Leibniz was planning to write, a work devoted to the development of a new philosophy of mind (the Elementa de Mente). The investigation focuses on the problem of the hypostatic union, namely, the theological doctrine established by the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) according to which two natures – human and divine – are substantially united in Christ in one single person or subsistence (hypostasis). Although starting from the need to explain the mystery of the Incarnation, this investigation also gives to Leibniz the opportunity to deal more generally with the problem of the relationship between mind and body. This relationship is presented in this text in terms of a hypostatic union. This is a provisional solution, as is the explanation given of the mystery of the Incarnation: although it is not explicitly rejected, it does not appear to have been resumed later. De Incarnatione Dei is, therefore, a passing phase in Leibniz’s thought. On the other hand, it seems that in his mature thought there are still traces of this youthful conception, insofar as Leibniz remains aware of the need to account for a substantial union of the two natures in Christ, and of the parallel between this problem and the problem of the union of mind and body in human beings.
	Leibniz defines the hypostatic union as “the action of a thing having in itself the principle of action immediately through another thing. [actio rei principium actus in se habentis immediatè per rem aliam]” (A VI.i: 534). According to what is stated in another early theological text, De Transsubstantiatione (probably written in 1668), (A VI.i: 15/2) a thing having the principle of action in itself coincides with a being subsisting through itself (ens per se subsistens), that is, a substance. Leibniz writes:

“I call Substance a Being subsisting through itself. All the Scholastic philosophers agree that a Being subsisting through itself is the same thing as a Suppositum. For Suppositum is a Substantial individual [individuum Substantiale] (just as a Person is a rational substantial individual) or some Substance in the individual. Moreover, the School commonly laid down that it is proper to the Suppositum that it is denominated by action; hence the Rule: actions are proper to Supposita [actiones sunt Suppositorum]. From which it is clear that the Suppositum, Substance, and the Being subsisting through itself, which are the same, are also rightly defined by the Scholastics: that which has the principle of action in itself, for otherwise it will not act but will be the instrument of an agent.” (A VI.i: 511)

In other words, from very early on Leibniz regards the power of acting, or, more precisely, the possession of an intrinsic principle of activity, as a necessary condition for qualifying as a substance – a tenet to which he will remain committed throughout his philosophical career. As we shall see, he might be seen as oscillating until the very end of his life regarding the extension of the category of substance: that is, in keeping open the question of whether composite beings such as living organisms -- plants, animals, human beings – are substances in the strict sense.​[5]​ But he seems to have been very certain from very early on regarding some necessary conditions of substantiality. In his view, in order to qualify as a substance an entity must have intrinsic principles of unity and activity. Most interestingly, in the early texts just mentioned, Leibniz already points to the possession of a principle of activity as the more fundamental principle.​[6]​ In De Incarnatione Dei he proposes in fact as a principle of unity sufficient to bestow on an entity enough unity to qualify as a being properly one, the immediate action of a substance through something else -- where substance is defined as a being having in itself the principle of its action, that is, possessing an intrinsic power of acting. This ‘something else’ is therefore the immediate instrument of action of the being having in itself the principle of that action. This results in a hypostatic union between the two entities, that is, in a kind of strict union by which the two entities are united in one subsistence. In Leibniz’s own words, there is a hypostatic union “in those things of which one perpetually acts on another in virtue of a peculiar action, or of which one is the immediate instrument of action of the other” (A VI.i: 534).
Let’s look more closely at Leibniz’s argumentation. According to him, there can be hypostastic union between: “1) God and Mind, 2) Mind and Body, 3) Body and Body through a shared mind” (A VI.i: 533). In fact, these three cases meet the conditions required for hypostatic union, which are listed later: “1.) The thing subsisting through itself or having in itself the principle of action, to which [something] is united. 2.) The other thing [Res alia], whatever it is, that is united. 3.) The action of the subsisting [thing], through the united [thing], on a third [thing], that is, the united [thing] must be an instrument of the subsisting [thing]. 4.) The immediacy of its action, that is, it must not act through another thing to which the same thing acted upon, and which was called the united to the first thing, is not united. For the united of the united is the united of the first thing” (A VI.i: 534). Instead, the possibility of a hypostatic union between body and body is ruled out because the body is not a substance (i.e. a “res per se subsistens”) and therefore the first of the conditions listed above is not met (A VI.i: 533). Very briefly, according to the young Leibniz, the body is not a substance because it does not have in itself the principle of its action, that is, it does not have in itself the principle of motion.
Besides excluding a hypostatic union between body and body, in De Incarnatione Dei Leibniz also excludes as impossible a hypostatic union between two imperfect (i.e. finite) minds. Indeed, in this case another of the conditions required for hypostatic union would not be met: the immediacy of the action of the unitum (united). The unitum (coinciding in this case with an “imperfect mind”) could not be an immediate instrument of the “thing subsisting through itself” (coinciding again with an “imperfect mind”) in that “an imperfect mind does not act outside itself except through the Body.” (A VI.i: 533)
This, however, is not true in the case of a perfect mind, which therefore may form a hypostatic union with an imperfect mind.​[7]​ This clarification is very important: if such a union were not possible, the incarnation of the Son of God would also not be possible. In this connection, we must first ask: Can there be a hypostatic union between God and bodies?​[8]​ Leibniz replies in the negative.​[9]​ The reason is that “God does not act on bodies, except by creating”:​[10]​ apart from destruction and creation, God does not act on bodies except by giving them motion, and, for Leibniz, this coincides with continuous creation.​[11]​ This conception is already present in the Demonstrationum Catholicarum Conspectus (1668-69*), where Leibniz plans to give a demonstration of the existence of God “from this principle, that motion cannot arise without continuous creation” (A VI.i: 494). It is then clarified in the letter to Jakob Thomasius of 20/30 April 1669, where Leibniz writes (A II.i: 23): “Properly speaking, motion does not exist in bodies, as a real thing in them, but it has been demonstrated by me that whatever is moved is continuously created, and that bodies in any instant when they are in motion are something, but in any time between the instants when they are in motion are nothing.” Behind this conception lies the idea that bodies do not have in themselves and of themselves any cohesion and that such cohesion cannot be reached even by movement, as it is interrupted by pauses. According to the young Leibniz, movement is in fact the cause of the size and shape of bodies; but since it, too, is interrupted by pauses, its conservation, as also the conservation of bodies, requires a continuous, new creation by God.​[12]​ 
Given that, for Leibniz, “there is no hypostatic union except through the action of one thing through another”,​[13]​ and the body cannot be an instrument of God’s action because “whoever creates acts on the thing, and does not act by means of the thing”,​[14]​ it follows that there can be no hypostatic union between God and a body. The mind can instead be an instrument of God’s action: through the mind that is united with him, God acts in bodies in a way different from the way he acts when he creates. When this happens, there is a hypostatic union between God and mind.​[15]​ In this way it is possible to solve the problem of the Incarnation: if the body of Christ cannot be joined to God directly (since, as we have seen, a hypostatic union between God and bodies is impossible), it can nonetheless be joined to God through the mind.
	At this point, the objection arises that there is thus no hypostatic union between the divine nature and the body of Christ, since one of the conditions for a hypostatic union is the immediacy of the relation between the “uniens” (that is, the “thing subsisting through itself ”) and the “unitum”. Leibniz replies: God and mind, joined hypostatically, form a single A; this single A, precisely because it includes also the mind, which functions as an “intermediate thing subsisting for itself,” can act immediately on the body (B) and therefore be joined hypostatically to B (A VI.i: 534); in fact, “unitum uniti est unitum primi [the united of the united is the united of the first thing]”(A VI.i: 534). 
In conclusion, according to the young Leibniz, this metaphysical model vindicates the possibility of the Incarnation as well as providing a possible explanation of the union of mind and body: there can be a hypostatic union between mind and body (A VI.i: 533) and, in the case of Christ, the mind hypostatically united to the body is in turn hypostatically united to God. The possibility of the Incarnation rests, therefore, on the possibility of a hypostatic union between body and mind, on the one hand, and the possibility of a hypostatic union between an imperfect (finite) and a perfect mind, on the other hand.
 
The mid-1680s -- De Persona Christi (1680-84*) and Examen Religionis Christianae (April-October 1686*).

Let’s now turn to Leibniz’s mature doctrine of the Incarnation as expounded in his texts of the mid-1680’s, notably De Persona Christi (1680-84*) and Examen Religionis Christianae (April-October 1686*).
Following the dictates of orthodoxy established by the Council of Chalcedon, Leibniz states that “in Christ there is one person, but two natures, divine and human.”​[16]​ Christ is therefore true God and true man. In order to guarantee the oneness of the person, it is, however, necessary to point out (as both Lutheran and Reformed Protestant Scholastics taught, on the model of the late church fathers and the medieval tradition) that the human nature taken on by the second person of the Trinity has the features of impersonality: that is, it is not self-subsistent but is assumed into the unity of the person (or subsistence, hypostasis) of the Word by virtue of the Incarnation.​[17]​ The canonical example, reproposed by Leibniz, is that of the union of body and soul. Also in this case there are two natures (spiritual and corporeal) in a single person, and also in this case it is perhaps possible to maintain, Leibniz prudently goes on to say, that the body is sustained by the subsistence of the soul or that matter is sustained by the subsistence of the form, so that there is only one subsistence, that of the form.​[18]​ Therefore, just as the person considered as a man (soul and body) is the same as when considered only as a soul, since the ‘personality’ or subsistence belongs to the soul, so too (Leibniz gives us to understand) the person of Christ is the same whether considered as the eternal, only begotten Son of God or as the Word incarnate, since the personality or subsistence is that of the divine person, in which the human nature is assumed.​[19]​
The analogy with the union of soul and body serves not only to let us glimpse something of the way in which two different natures are united but also, more modestly, to indicate the actual possibility of such a union, leaving aside human beings’s ability (or rather, inability) of establishing how this union is possible. This of course leaves open the enormously complex problem of how Leibniz himself conceives of the soul and body and the relation between them. He seems, however, to suggest that it is not necessary to discuss the matter here. The argument based on the actual union of soul and body remains valid no matter how this union is explained. To Spinoza’s objection that to maintain that God takes on human nature would be just as contradictory as to attribute the nature of a square to a circle,​[20]​ Leibniz replies: “Those who teach the incarnation explain its meaning by the simile of the Rational Soul united to the body. Therefore they want God to have assumed the nature of a man in no other way than that in which the mind assumed [assumsit] the nature of the body, that is, in the same way in which this is manifested [constat] in experience: no matter what the modes of explication may be. What therefore is said about the circle taking on the nature of the square cannot more forcefully be objected to the incarnation than to the union of the body with the soul” (A VI.iii: 371). A fact —the union of soul and body in human beings—indicates the possibility (and therefore noncontradictoriness) of the union of two different natures in one and the same person, however incomprehensible for limited human reason the mode of that union may be. I will come back in the final part of my paper to the problems presented by this line of defence in the context of Leibniz’s philosophy.
I come now to Leibniz constant opposition to the so-called communicatio idiomatum (communication of properties). However it may come about, Leibniz insists, the union of human nature and divine nature in the person of Christ (traditionally referred to by the expression unio personalis [personal union]) is the closest and most perfect union possible between Creator and creature.​[21]​ However, Leibniz warns, no one can claim to know exactly how this union comes to be. It is thus necessary to proceed with extreme caution, keeping to the teachings of the scriptures and tradition.​[22]​ Tradition, in fact, condemns as erroneous two opposite ways of conceiving of this union: Nestorianism, which with its excessive distinction of the two natures ends up by turning Christ into two persons, and Eutychianism, which in order to ensure the unity of the person ends up by confounding the two natures, making Christ’s humanity divine and ultimately admitting only the divine nature in the incarnate Word.​[23]​ If it does not reach the excesses of Eutychianism, the interpretation of the consequences of the personal union proposed in the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum  at least tends, in Leibniz’s opinion, in that direction. And, what is more, it is to be irrevocably rejected because it involves a contradiction. This seems to be the real reason, in accordance with his continually repeated statement that what is contradictory cannot but be false, that leads Leibniz to separate himself from the majority of Lutherans and come closer to the solution proposed by the Reformed Church. As we read in De Persona Christi, “the attributes and operations of one Nature are not to be attributed to the other nature . . . and certainly it seems contradictory to attribute the things that are proper to one nature to the other” (A VI.iv: 2296). The contradiction Leibniz refers to corresponds to the logical error of which Reformed thinkers accused the Lutherans: the teaching of a communicatio idiomatum in abstracto, that is, a communication or attribution of the properties of one nature considered in the abstract (respectively as ‘divinity’ and ‘humanity’) to the other nature, also considered in the abstract. Thus one reaches the contradictory statements that divinity as such has died (as Theopaschitism maintains) or that humanity as such enjoys ubiquity (as Ubiquitarianism --admitted by Lutherans as a necessary condition for the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist-- holds).​[24]​ Leibniz adds, to these two errors, also Monothelitism, that is, the admission in Christ of a single will, considering also this to be an undue confusion between the attributes and the operations of the two natures.​[25]​ The only admissible form of attribution to Christ both of the divine properties and of human ones is attribution in the concrete: the attributes of, respectively, the divine nature and human nature are thus predicated of the concrete person of Christ, in his indissoluble unity of the two natures. Only in this sense is it possible to say that God (and, to be sure, not the divinity considered in the abstract as divinity) has died, or that man (and not humanity considered in the abstract as such) enjoys ubiquity.​[26]​ In other words, “it can be said that a man is omnipresent in the same way as it can be said that a poet treats diseases, if the same man is also a doctor. Let it be understood in a sound way, that is, that he who is [eum qui est] a man, though not qua man, but qua God, is omnipresent, and that he who is [eum qui est] God was born of a virgin, but not inasmuch as he is God [non qua est Deus]. For we speak of the Divine or human nature in Christ according as Divine or human attributes are ascribed to the Christ.” (De Persona Christi; A VI.iv: 2296). 
Leibniz’s solution therefore seems to lead in the direction of the praedicatio verbalis (verbal predication) admitted by Reformed thinkers: there is no real communication of properties from one nature to the other but a merely verbal predication of the attributes of both natures to the sole person of Jesus Christ. This praedicatio verbalis is, however, further to be qualified as praedicatio vera (true predication), since, for example, the predication of the omniscience or omnipotence of man occurs by synecdoche, a rhetorical figure in which the whole is referred to by one of its parts.​[27]​ 
The union of the two natures, Leibniz goes on, therefore occurs by virtue of the assumption of human nature in the single subsistence (or person) of the divine Word; this does not involve a communication of the divine properties, shared by the three persons of the Trinity, to human nature.​[28]​ If, in fact, the hypostatic union consisted in the communication of properties, objects Leibniz, then the Father would be hypostatically united to the Son, to whom his divine attributes are communicated.​[29]​ The analogy with the union of soul and body is once again useful for illustrating this point: in this case too the union does not involve any communication by the soul of its faculties of will and intellect to the body, just as, reciprocally, the body does not communicate to the soul the attribute of extension in space, and all this is true even though some operations can be understood only in the context of the union of the two.​[30]​ Still, Leibniz is well aware of the distance between the two cases: unlike what happens in the Incarnation, the human soul, by virtue of the union, to some extent does share the body’s imperfection.​[31]​ In conclusion, it is enough to believe that, through the Incarnation, all the perfections that created nature is capable of are communicated to humanity, with the exclusion of what in human nature would contravene Christ’s task of redemption, and barring any communication of the imperfection of human nature to the divine nature.​[32]​

The correspondence with Des Bosses (1706-1716)

We turn now to Leibniz’s late years and to the epistolary exchange with the Jesuit Bartholomew Des Bosses which takes place in the last decade of Leibniz’s life. The beginning of this correspondence falls in a period in which Leibniz begins to toy with the idea of a metaphysical union of soul and body which is not part of his theory of pre-established harmony but which he does not deny could be admitted.​[33]​ This line of thinking is stimulated by his belated notice of an article published in the March 1704 issue of the influential Jesuit journal, the so-called Mémoires de Trévoux, by one of its editors, René-Joseph Tournemine.​[34]​ In it Tournemine objects that Leibniz’s system of pre-established harmony is no more capable of accounting for a “veritable union” between soul and body than the occasionalist brand of Cartesianism criticized by the German thinker.
Tournemine’s objection seems to have stuck in Leibniz’s mind. To be sure, in a letter to Burcher de Volder of the same period, Leibniz dismisses Tournemine’s demand for an explanation of the metaphysical union between mind and body over and above mere agreement as a typical Scholastic hankering after unintelligible doctrines. Over and above the agreement that we perceive between mind and body, Leibniz claims, there is no manifestation in experience of this alleged metaphysical union between the two. Insofar as that of which we have experience (‘the phenomena’) is satisfactorily accounted for by the doctrine of pre-established harmony, there is no need to look for further explanations.​[35]​ The slightly exasperated tone of Leibniz in this letter, however, may have been as much a result of his exasperation with constantly resurgent problems raised by composite entities as of his annoyance with Tournemine for casting a shadow on his elegant proposal. After all, his New System does claim to explain “the union which exists between the soul and the body”.​[36]​  Insofar as an “agreement” falls short of a proper “union”, Tournemine’s objection could not be so easily dismissed as Scholastic sophistry. Rather, it turns the spot-light on the ontological status of Aristotelian paradigmatic substances – plants, animals, human beings – in Leibniz’s mature philosophy. In the Aristotelian tradition, being and unity are convertible (ens et unum convertuntur): nothing can be a being without having a degree of unity. As mentioned before, following this tradition, Leibniz maintains that one of the fundamental requisites for qualifying as a substance is to be endowed with an intrinsic unity, to be unum per se. Granted this fundamental requisite, the question arises whether the degree of unity of living creatures such as plants and animals is sufficient for them to qualify, strictly speaking, as substances. Leibniz, of course, often writes of living organisms (including human beings) as corporeal substances. But do they really satisfy the substantiality criterion of being unum per se? Or are they called substances only in the broad sense of enjoying a degree of unity clearly superior to that of a heap of stones or a flock of sheep? 
Despite the beautiful economy of his theory of simple substances (the monads) out of which everything else results, Leibniz is drawn into a sustained discussion of the possible need for an union stronger than that provided by the system of pre-established harmony or, more specifically, by monadic domination. In his correspondence with Des Bosses, Leibniz confronts the problem head-on.​[37]​ In three letters to Des Bosses of 3 September 1708, 30 April 1709, and 8 September 1709 he returnes to his response to Tournemine, now acknowledging explicitly that he does not deny the possibility of a metaphysical union.​[38]​ From 1712 onward Leibniz’s letters to Des Bosses explore the issue of a metaphysical union which provides the ultimate principle of unity of composite substance through the introduction of the controversial notion of vinculum substantiale or substantial bond.​[39]​ This terminology was not unprecedented, especially in seventeenth-century Jesuit metaphysics; but the notion itself is something new in the context of Leibniz’s metaphysics of monads and is definitely at odds with his often reiterated tenet that only monads, and in them perception and appetite, are ultimately real. With the vinculum substantiale – that is “a certain union, or rather a real unifier superadded to the monads by God”​[40]​ -- he introduces a further level of irreducible metaphysical reality over and above monads. Whereas his ‘standard’ theory of monads regards monadic domination as sufficient to provide the unity of a composite (or corporeal) substance, the theory of the vinculum substantiale postulates the necessity of a stronger principle of unity not simply reducible to the monads. 
However, in Leibniz’s view, what exactly is this stronger principle of unity necessary for? Is it necessary as a principle of unity of composite substances? Or is it necessary only for some superior, perhaps purely supernatural, kind of substantial union not required for the degree of unity which suffices to a being to qualify as a substance?​[41]​ If one keeps the issue of a substantial union distinct from the issue of the intrinsic unity required for substantiality, Leibniz could still remain perfectly content with monadic domination as a sufficient principle of unity of corporeal substances while acknowledging its insufficiency to provide the substantial union required in certain special cases. The relation holding between a dominating monad and the other monads of a corporeal substance is not a merely mental unity bestowed by a mind external to the entity in question, as it is in the case of aggregates such as a flock of sheep.​[42]​ Monadic domination provides a principle of unity internal to the composite. Although still relational, this unity is intrinsic to the composite and this could suffice for qualifying as a per se unity.​[43]​ The corporeal substance of the five-fold scheme presented by Leibniz in his famous letter to De Volder of 20 June 1703 would thus be, strictly speaking, a substance and not an aggregate, given Leibniz’s quite explicit denial of the status of substances to aggregates.​[44]​ In brief, if for Leibniz monadic domination is sufficient for per se unity, there would be in Leibniz’s later philosophy genuine corporeal substances as non-aggregate Monadic composites.​[45]​ The final verdict on the ontological status of the paradigmatic Aristotelian substances – plants, animals, human beings – would be that they are, strictly speaking, substances also in a world ultimately resulting only from monads. 
Although this is an attractive proposal, it seems that corporeal substances still have to face the challenge of having a merely relational unity. In my view, it remains doubtful that such unity, although internal to the composite, could count as the intrinsic, per se unity, required for substantiality. True, the unity of a corporeal substance is of a higher degree than the merely extrinsic unity bestowed by a mind perceiving an aggregate such a flock of sheep. But as a relational unity, the unity of a corporeal substance is still an ideal as opposed to a real unity. Although grounded in the internal states of monads dominated by the perceptions of a preeminent monad, it still comes down to an agreement amongst substances which perceive / express each other, but have no real connection amongst them.  It is difficult to see how such a composite could qualify as an entity which is properly and strictly one, although it can certainly be said to be ‘one’ in a stronger sense than a flock of sheep can also be said to be ‘one’.  
On the other hand, the issue of substantial unity should indeed be kept distinct from that of substantial union. The problem which is exercising Leibniz in his correspondence with Des Bosses is that his monadic framework does not seem to have space for a substantial union, that is, a union of a plurality of substances into a substantial being. The absence of a strong vinculum (that is, a “union, or rather a real unifier”) is a problem not only for Transubstantiation and Incarnation, but also for beings such as plants, animals and human beings which, according to the theory of monads, are conceived as composites of a multitude of substances. In short, it seems that Leibniz’s mature metaphysics accounts for substantial unity (instantiated by the only true substances, that is, simple substances or monads) but not for a substantial union of substances which could result in the per se unity required for a substance.
Approaching both the end of his correspondence with Des Bosses and the end of his life, Leibniz candidly confesses that he is not at all sure that the things he has written in his letters regarding the vinculum substantiale versus his more typical monadological views are or could be made consistent with one another.​[46]​ And yet doubts about the necessity, at least in certain cases, of a more robust principle of unity superadded to monads for a real union seem to have been genuinely nagging at his mind. Finding himself unable to produce a theory sufficiently coherent with his previous explanation of phenomena through the doctrine of pre-established harmony, he even proposes that a plausible account of this stronger metaphysical union is above the scope of limited human reason (“It is like in the Mysteries”, he writes to Tournemine).​[47]​ But he does not deny that something of the sort could be possible or even necessary in certain cases. Interestingly, the cases explicitly mentioned by Leibniz belong to the realm of the mysteries of revealed theology. Although Leibniz famously played with the notion of vinculum substantiale in order to provide a possible explanation of the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, it seems that the mystery which concerned him most in this regard was rather that of the Incarnation. As a Lutheran he was not committed to the doctrine of transubstantiation, and especially in these later years his youthful sympathies toward it had very noticeably cooled down; but he remained throughout his life committed to the mystery of the Incarnation. As we have seen, the union in Christ of divine and human natures was traditionally explained through the analogy in human beings of the union of soul and body. Leibniz repeatedly endorses this analogy but never seems to have applied his distinctive theory of the union of soul and body through pre-established harmony to it, probably because this doctrine does not seem to provide the robust union of the two natures in one single person required by an orthodox reading of the mystery. He constantly repeats that Christ is not an “Ens per aggregationem [Being by aggregation]”​[48]​ but enjoys a true unity, the unity of the person – by which he seems to mean the intrinsic unity of a substantial being.​[49]​ It is plausible to think that, even in his own eyes, the doctrine of pre-established harmony applied to the union of human and divine natures in Christ could have brought his metaphysics of the Incarnation perilously close to the Nestorian heresy,​[50]​ which he decidedly rejected.​[51]​ The merely moral union envisaged by Nestorianism is in fact a sort of moral agreement and harmony amongst the thoughts and volitions of two distinct persons (that is, two distinct substantial beings), rather than a real union in one suppositum. 
Moreover, in the context of Leibniz’s metaphysics, the analogy between the case of the Incarnation and the union of mind and body presents a further problem. In Leibniz’s monadological conception, mind and body do not represent two radically different ‘natures’ as they do in the Cartesian framework, with its sharp distinction between res cogitans and res extensa; and if these natures are not radically different, then their union cannot provide an analogy applicable to the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. But even if one grants that the distinction between a dominating monad (the ‘mind’) and an aggregate resulting, ultimately, from monads (the ‘body’) is sufficient to serve as an analogy with the union of divine and human natures in Christ, the underlying question still remains of whether Leibniz’s metaphysics has the resources for granting the status of single substance to any composite entity. Whereas Leibniz could safely remain uncommitted on the vexed issue of whether the status of substances could be granted, strictly speaking, to the composites of monads which we perceive as living organisms (animals or plants), the same does not apply to an orthodox understanding of the dogma of the Incarnation. So much Leibniz confesses to Des Bosses in a letter of 10 October 1712: “Nor do we need any other thing besides Monads and their modifications, for Philosophy as opposed to the supernatural. But I fear that we cannot explain the mystery of the Incarnation, and other things, unless real bonds or unions are added.”​[52]​ A couple of years before, in the Theodicy he had written:

“Although I do not hold that the soul changes the body’s laws, nor that the body changes the soul’s laws, and I have introduced the pre-established Harmony to avoid this disorder, I do not fail to admit a true union between the soul and the body, which makes it a suppositum. This union is metaphysical, whereas a union of influence would be physical. But when we speak of the union of the Word of God with human nature, we must be content with a knowledge by analogy, such as the comparison of the union of the Soul with the body is capable of giving us; and we must also be content to say that the incarnation is the closest union that can exist between the Creator and the creature, without any need of going further.” (G VI, 81)

In his reply of 1708 to Father Tournemine’s objection, Leibniz had already hinted at the fact that the stronger “metaphysical union” demanded by the learned Jesuit is something above our full grasp – and yet, Leibniz does not deny its possibility:

“I have only tried to account for the Phenomena, that is to say, the relationship one perceives between the Soul and the Body. But as the Metaphysical union added to it is not a Phenomenon, and has not even been given an intelligible notion, I have not taken it upon myself to find a reason for it. However, I do not deny that there is something of this nature … It is like in the Mysteries, where we also try to elevate what we understand of the ordinary development of Creatures to something more sublime that can correspond to them in relation to the Divine Nature and Power, without being able to conceive in them anything sufficiently distinct and sufficiently appropriate to form an entirely intelligible Definition. It is also for the same reason that, down here, one cannot perfectly account for these Mysteries, nor understand them entirely. There is [in them] something more than mere Words, but nevertheless one cannot obtain an exact explanation of the Terms.” (G VI, 595-6)

In short, it seems that his defense of the doctrine of pre-established harmony as sufficient to explain the relationship which we perceive between mind and body ultimately rests on a methodological rather than an ontological commitment. That is to say, Leibniz declines to postulate a metaphysical union between mind and body not because he has firm views about its existence or non-existence, but because such postulation is unnecessary for the explanation of phenomena. When faced with the challenge of cases which go beyond the phenomena, he acknowledges that the postulation of a metaphysical union might well be needed. In other words, he leaves open the possibility of a stronger metaphysical union as a truth above human reason since it is needed to account for certain mysteries of revealed religion to the possibility of which he is committed.​[53]​ 
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^1	  I would like to thank Paul Lodge for his insightful and helpful feedback on an earlier version of this chapter, and for sharing with me his forthcoming contribution on “Corporeal Substances as Monadic Composites in Leibniz’s Later Philosophy”. I presented this paper in York and at an early modern seminar in London. I am grateful to participants, and especially to Donald Rutherford, for their questions and remarks. Finally, thanks are due to Howard Hotson for his perceptive comments on the final draft.
^2	  I discuss the way in which Leibniz deals with problems raised by truths above reason in Antognazza 2011.
^3	  A date accompanied by an asterisk indicates the period from which the text probably dates. 
^4	  The following discussion draws from Antognazza 2007 and 2009. Unless otherwise stated translations of Leibniz’s texts are from Antognazza 2007.
^5	  Cf. LDB, “Introduction,” xliv-xlv.  
^6	  Look and Rutherford note that, for Leibniz, the possession of a primitive active force explains how a being qualifies as a true unity and, therefore, as a substance: the primitive active force of this being provides the basis of its persistence, of its identity through change (LDB, “Introduction,” xl-xli).
^7	  A VI.i: 533: “Two minds cannot be joined hypostatically, unless one is perfect and one is imperfect.”
^8	  A VI.i: 533: “Now it is to be inquired whether God is hypostatically united to all bodies or to all the World, or can be to some or to none.”
^9	  A VI.i: 533: “I think the world or bodies are not united hypostatically to God.”
^10	  A VI.i: 534.
^11	  A VI.i: 533: “Moreover, God cannot act otherwise on bodies (if we exclude annihilation and creation) than by conferring motion; while, then, they are moved, they are continuously created, as has been demonstrated by me.” 
^12	  See Kabitz 1909, pp. 87 and 61–62. It should be pointed out that the idea of conservation in being as continuous creation by God is present also in Descartes (Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, AT VII, 48–49). In the Principia Philosophiae, Descartes makes the conservation of the same quantity of movement in the universe depend on God and the constancy of his will (cf. part II, xxxvi). Lastly, it should be noted that already in the Theoria Motus Abstracti, probably composed in the winter of 1670–1671, Leibniz modifies his conception, abandoning the idea that movement is interrupted by pauses (A VI.ii: 265): “Motion is continuous, or interrupted by no pauses.”
^13	  A VI.i: 533. Leibniz states in a variant (A VI.ii: 578): “For a Hypostatic union it is required that one be the instrument of the other.”
^14	  A VI.i: 534: “And indeed, whoever creates acts on the thing, and does not act by means of the thing, and so the thing is not his instrument of action.”
^15	  Having ruled out the hypostatic union between God and bodies, since, as we have seen, God can act on bodies only by creating, Leibniz emphasizes that this is precisely the point of distinction between the action of the mind and the action of God on the body (A VI.i: 534): “The mind does not act on the body by creating, but by moving; God creates. … In truth, the instrument of God is the mind, united to God, by which God acts on bodies otherwise than by creating. Therefore the hypostatically united is nothing else but what is the immediate instrument of a thing having the principle of action in itself.” 
^16	  De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2294-2295).
^17	  See De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2294–2295): “On the person of Christ. In Christ there is one person, but two natures, divine and human. A little above it was shown that the Word, i.e. the Son, is the second person of the Godhead; the same son is a man, who is called the Christ. Hence the person of Christ is itself that second person of the Godhead, which took on the flesh in time. Therefore, there is one person, who is both man and God, and two natures, one divine and eternal, the other human and assumed, which subsists in the personality or subsistence [subsistentia] of the word as an arm in the subsistence of the body.”
^18	  Cf. De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2295–2296): “Furthermore, just as the Mystery of the Trinity is very well illustrated by the similitude of the Mind reflecting on itself, so the Mystery of the incarnation is very well illustrated by the Union of Mind and body, as also the Holy Fathers (Justin the Martyr, Athanasius, and Augustine) recognized. For they remain two natures and make one person; perhaps it can even be said non inappropriately that the body is sustained by the subsistence [subsistentia] of the soul, or matter by the subsistence of the form, so that there is no other subsistence of a composite than that of the form, from which also some Scholastics do not seem to shrink away.” See also De Scriptura, Ecclesia, Trinitate (A VI.iv: 2290): “As for the person of Christ, the union of natures cannot be better explained than is done by the Holy Fathers by the union of soul and body”; Examen Religionis Christianae (A VI.iv: 2366–2367): “The Holy Fathers illustrate very well the mystery of the Incarnation by comparison with the union of soul and body, for just as the soul and body are one man, so God and man are one Christ. But there is this difference, that the soul takes something from the imperfections of the body, whereas the divine nature cannot suffer any imperfection. But the words ‘person’ and ‘nature’ are used quite appropriately; for just as several persons have the one nature of Godhead, so on the other hand one of the persons of the Godhead embraces more than one nature, i.e. divine and human.”
^19	  The passage from De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2296) quoted in the previous note goes on as follows: “And it seems proper that the person of man and of the separate soul are called the same. . . . Therefore the union of natures does not consist in the communication of properties [communicatio idiomatum], but in one subsistence. Therefore the Word bestows his subsistence on humanity.” Cf. also GRUA, 338: “If it were imagined that he was a man before the assumption, nothing would be detracted from him by changing him with regard to nature, or detracting personality from him, but something would supervene; and so humanity or nature is not an abstractum philosophicum.” Abstracta philosophica are ideal or mental entities which designate the properties of concrete individuals (for example, the property of ‘humanity’ inhering in a concrete man). This final remark should be read in the context of Leibniz’s brief comment on the thesis of Petau 1644-1650 according to which, in Christ, it is preferable to consider that it is not the abstracta (divinity, humanity) that are joined, but the concreta (God, man) (GRUA, 338): “Divine and human nature are not in fact abstracta, but concreta, i.e. Beings [Entia].” Leibniz seems to mean that in the Incarnation divinity and humanity are not considered as abstracta, but as concreta (God, man).
^20	  See A VI.iii: 370–371. This is an extract from one of Spinoza’s three letters to Oldenburg, seen by Leibniz probably on the occasion of his visit to London in October 1676. Leibniz’s copy, with numerous annotations, is published in A VI.iii: N. 26 (Epistolae Tres D. B. de Spinoza ad Oldenburgium). The three letters can also be found in SO.iv: Epistle LXXV (December 1675–January 1676), 311–316; Epistle LXXVIII (7 February 1676), 326–329; Epistle LXXIII (November–December 1675), 306–309. The letter we are interested in here is this last one, indicated in Leibniz’s copy as Epist. 3tia (3rd Epistle).
^21	  Il n’y a qu’un seul Dieu (A VI.iv: 2211): “There is a very close union between the divine nature and humanity of Jesus Christ. This union does not only consist in the agreement or conformity of feelings, but also in a real influence, presence and intimate operation.” See also Symbole et Antisymbole des Apostres, 1678*, in Antognazza 1991, p. 538: “Also those who speak of the divine nature of Jesus Christ understand nothing else but the fullness of the word or Divine Wisdom which lives in one who was born of Mary; this habitation [inhabitation] is called a personal union, because it is very perfect.” In § 55 of the “Preliminary Discourse,” Leibniz repeats that the Incarnation is the closest possible union between Creator and creature. Referring to the analogy of the union of soul and body, he seems to want to avoid using the term influence used in Il n’y a qu’un seul Dieu, as this might make one think of a “physical” union, whereas both in the case of the union of soul and body and in that of the Incarnation, the union is “metaphysical” (G VI, 81): “Although I do not hold that the soul changes the body’s laws, nor that the body changes the soul’s laws, and I have introduced the pre-established Harmony to avoid this disorder, I do not fail to admit a true union between the soul and the body, which makes it a suppositum. This union is metaphysical, whereas a union of influence would be physical. But when we speak of the union of the Word of God with human nature, we must be content with a knowledge by analogy, such as the comparison of the union of the Soul with the body is capable of giving us; and we must also be content to say that the incarnation is the closest union that can exist between the Creator and the creature, without any need of going further.”
^22	  See Symbole et Antisymbole des Apostres, 537–538: “One does not very well know what it is that person, nature and union are in these divine matters. . . . The difference consists only in the mode of the union of the humanity of Jesus Christ with the Word that is divine wisdom. And as no one can boast to understand the manner of this union, one disputes only about formulas”; Il n’y a qu’un seul Dieu (A VI.iv: 2211–2212): “We do not sufficiently understand what the terms Person, Nature, and Union mean with regard to God. . . . [T]he safest thing is to hold on to the formulas that God himself has revealed. And it is for this reason that it would be a good thing for Theologians to stop using expressions that scripture and the perpetual tradition of the Catholic Church do not authorize”; Examen Religionis Christianae (A VI.iv: 2367): “Regarding the mode of the Union of Natures, many subtle questions are raised, which it would be better not to broach.” In De Scriptura, Ecclesia, Trinitate (A VI.iv: 2290–2291) Leibniz writes: “It is sufficient that we believe that by the incarnation . . . the fullness of divinity dwelled in humanity by a true union.”
^23	  See De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2295): “For those who maintain that there are two persons either make of Christ a Being by aggregation, like a society, composed of a man or God dwelling in a man, as the devil dwells in the possessed, or certainly they make two Christs or sons, one of man and the other of God, and they ought to deny either that the one Christ is a man or that Christ is God; but those who maintain there is one nature ought, on the other hand, either to deny one of the two or to say that divinity is humanity.”
^24	  It should be pointed out that Leibniz, though he rejects the communicatio idiomatum and consequent ubiquitism, nonetheless admits the real presence. See De Scriptura, Ecclesia, Trinitate (A VI.iv: 2290): “I do not see what advantage ubiquity brings, since Christ is not [present] in the supper in the same way in which he is everywhere, but in a peculiar way.”
^25	  See De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2296): “The attributes and operations of one Nature are not to be ascribed to the other nature. Thus it is to be said, against the Theopaschites, that the Godhead did not suffer; against the Ubiquitists that humanity is not omnipresent; and against the Monothelites that the operation or volition of the Godhead and humanity is not single”; De Scriptura, Ecclesia, Trinitate (A VI.iv: 2290): “More appropriately it is said that the Godhead did not suffer, nor is humanity omnipresent.” On the disputes that arose around the Monothelites, accused of Eutychianism by their adversaries, against whom, in their turn, the upholders of Monothelitism launched the charge of Nestorianism, cf. Leibniz to Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, 1/11 October 1692 (A I.viii: 173–174) and Bossuet to Leibniz, 27 December 1692 (A I.viii: 216).
^26	  See Examen Religionis Christianae (A VI.iv: 2367–2368): “Regarding the mode of the Union of Natures, many subtle questions are raised, which it would be better not to broach. Among other things, [there is the question] of the communication idiomatum, [namely,] whether indeed and to what extent the properties of one nature can be attributed to the other, as if this were necessary. It is sufficient that what otherwise belongs to the individual natures should be attributed rightly in the concrete instance [Sufficit concreto recte tribui]; for it is correctly said that God suffered in Christ, and the man is omniscient and omnipotent; but to attribute, in virtue of the union, omnipotence, ubiquity and (as follows with equal justification) eternity to humanity, and to ascribe nativity and passion to the divinity, is in either case to talk nonsense, as it is either akyrologia or a contradiction.” In De Persona Christi, after having affirmed thecontradictoriness of the attribution of what belongs to one nature to the other, Leibniz adds (A VI.iv: 2296): “But God was born, and a virgin gave birth to God.” See also the reference abstracta philosophica in footnote 19.
^27	  On the distinction between communicatio idiomatum in abstracto and in concreto, and on praedicatio verbalis, see Muller 1985, pp. 72–74, 153, 237. Cf. also Sparn 1986, p. 162.
^28	  De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2296): “Therefore the union of natures does not consist in the communicatio idiomatum, but in subsistence. And so the Word bestows its subsistence on humanity, not its essence, nor essential properties, which are indeed common also to the other persons of the Godhead.” Cf. also Leibniz to Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, 1/11 October 1692 (A I.viii: 173–174): “The personal union . . . means that the human nature does not have its own proper subsistence, as it would have naturally without that. . . . There are a thousand difficulties in philosophy regarding the commingling of God with creatures. . . . And the difficulty becomes even greater when God joins with a creature that is united to him personally, and that has only in him its subsistence or its suppositum.”
^29	  The passage from De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2296) quoted in the previous note continues as follows: “And certainly, if the Hypostatic union consisted in the communication of properties, also the father would be united hypostatically to the son, to whom he communicated his attributes.”
^30	  See De Scriptura, Ecclesia, Trinitate (A VI.iv: 2291).
^31	  See Examen Religionis Christianae (A VI.iv: 2366).
^32	  See De Scriptura, Ecclesia, Trinitate (A VI.iv: 2290–2291); De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2296); Examen Religionis Christianae (A VI.iv: 2367–2368).
^33	  Cf. Adams 1994, pp. 295-299.
^34	  Tournemine 1704.
^35	  Leibniz to De Volder, 19 January 1706 (LDV, 331): “You rightly despair of obtaining from me something for which I neither raise nor have the hope, nor even the desire. In the schools they commonly seek things that are not so much ultramundane as utopian. The clever French Jesuit Tournemine recently provided me with an elegant example. After he had offered some praise of my pre-established harmony— which seemed to provide an explanation of the agreement that we perceive between soul and body— he said that he still desired one thing, namely, an explanation of the union, which assuredly differs from the agreement. I responded that whatever that metaphysical union is that the schools add over and above agreement, it is not a phenomenon and there is no notion of, or acquaintance with, it. Thus I could not have intended to explain it.”
^36	  The full title of the New System, published in 1695 in the Journal des Sçavans, is as follows: “Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que l’union qu’il y a entre l’ âme et le corps”. My emphasis. See WF, 10-20.
^37	  For an outstanding, nuanced discussion of the theory of substance put forward by Leibniz in his correspondence with Des Bosses, see LDB, “Introduction”,  xxxviii-lxxix.
^38	  See respectively LDB, 100-105 (see pp. 100-101); 122-129 (see pp. 124-127); 148-153 (see pp. 152-153). Mentioned by Adams 1994, p. 297.
^39	  See Adams 1994, pp. 299-303. An illuminating discussion of the changes in Leibniz’s conception of the vinculum unfolding during his correspondence with Des Bosses is contained in LDB, “Introduction”, lx-lxxii.
^40	  Leibniz to De Bosses, 5 February 1712 (G II, 435. Trans. by Adams 1994, p. 299).
^41	  I am very grateful to Paul Lodge for pressing me on this issue.
^42	   See LDV, 275: “an aggregate is nothing other than all the things from which it results taken together, which clearly have their unity only from a mind, on account of those things that they have in common, like a flock of sheep”.
^43	  There is some textual evidence that even in his late years Leibniz is trying to make a case for the per se unity of corporeal substances. See a text of 1702 where Leibniz writes: “Primitive active force, which Aristotle calls first entelechy and one commonly calls the form of a substance, is another natural principle which, together with matter or passive force, completes a corporeal substance. This substance, of course, is one per se, and not a mere aggregate of many substances, for there is a great difference between an animal, for example, and a flock.” (G IV, 395 / AG, 252). However, this text is not as clear as one might wish since what Leibniz calls here “corporeal substance” seems to correspond to what Leibniz calls “monad” in other texts, that is, the substance “completed”  by primitive active force and matter or passive force (e.g. LDV, 264, cited below, footnote 44). The expression “corporeal substance” might refer here to a monad “insofar as it has an organic body” (LDB, liii).  Cf. Adams 1994, p. 269 on the “Qualified Monad Conception”. 
^44	  Leibniz to De Volder (20 June 1703): “I distinguish therefore (1) the primitive Entelechy or Soul, (2) Matter, i. e. primary matter, or primitive passive power, (3) the Monad completed by these two, (4) the Mass [Massa] or secondary matter, or organic machine, for which countless subordinate Monads come together [ad quam . . . concurrunt], (5) the Animal or corporeal substance, which is made One by the Monad dominating the Machine.” (trans. by Adams 1994, p. 265; see original in LDV 264). Leibniz to De Volder (19 November 1703): “when it is asked what we understand by the word substance, I point out that aggregates must be excluded before everything else” (LDV, 275).
^45	  See Lodge’s excellent discussion in his forthcoming “Corporeal Substances as Monadic Composites in Leibniz’s Later Philosophy”. Lodge’s contribution engages in particular with the position presented by Look and Rutherford in their introduction to LDB. The status of corporeal substances in Leibniz’s mature philosophy is one of the most hotly debated issues in recent critical literature. It would be impossible to do justice to the richness and sophistication of such debate within the limits of this chapter. 
^46	  See Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 June 1715 (LDB, 341).
^47	  Remarque de l'Auteur du Systeme de l'Harmonie préetablie sur un endroit des Memoires de Trevoux du Mars 1704 (G VI, 596). An English translation is included in WF, 249-251.
^48	  See De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2295).
^49	  Symbole et Antisymbole des Apostres, 538: “Also those who speak of the divine nature of Jesus Christ understand nothing else but the fullness of the word or of the Divine Wisdom, which dwells in him who was born of Mary; this habitation is called personal union since it is very perfect”; Il n’y a qu’un seul Dieu (A VI.iv: 2211): “There is a very close union between the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ. This union does not consist only in the concord or conformity of feelings, but also in a real influence, presence and intimate operation.” See also De Scriptura, Ecclesia, Trinitate (A VI.iv: 2291); De Persona Christi (A VI.iv: 2294–2297).
^50	  In Christ there would be two natures and two persons, connected by a moral union.
^51	  See, e.g., the Demonstrationum Catholicarum Conspectus, chap. 28 (A VI.i: 497).
^52	  LDB, 276-278. Trans. by Adams 1994, p. 304.
^53	  Cf. Antognazza 2007, pp. 35-37; Adams 1994, pp. 303-307; and LDB, “Introduction,” esp. lxxviii-lxxix. On the problems and possible weaknesses unveiled in Leibniz’s philosophy by the concept of vinculum substantiale see Look 2004, pp. 238-261 (esp. pp. 239, 259) and Look 1999, esp. pp. 13-16.
^54	  On the vinculum substantiale see Adams 1994, pp. 299–305; Rutherford 1995, pp. 276–281; and Look 1999.
^55	  In their “Introduction” to LDB, Look and Rutherford come to the conclusion that Leibniz needs a vinculum over and above monads in order to account for corporeal substances as substances in a strict sense. In turn, such corporeal substances and hence a vinculum would be needed in order to account for certain mysteries of the Christian religion.
^56	  Garber 2009 argues that “at the time of [Leibniz’s] death, his philosophy is still a work in progress” (Dust-Jacket). This seems to be the case in the matter at hand, that is, his explanation of the Incarnation along the traditional lines of an analogy with the union of mind and body.
